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LEXINGTON, Ky., MAY, 1916.

No. 8

THE RIGHT AGAINST FALSE ATTRIBUTION OF BELIEF
OR UTTERANCE.
In the Kentucky Law Journal for December, 1915, (Vol. IV,

p. 22), appeared an approving comment, by L. Meriwether Smith,
9sq., of the Harrodsburg Bar, on the Right of Privacy as recognized
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,
134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909).

The right of privacy is indeed recognized explicitly in that
opinion. But the right of privacy covered only part of the wrongful
act in that case, viz.: the publication of the plaintiff's picture for
advertising purposes, and was so understood by the Court." The remainder of the wrongful act, viz.: the false attribution to the plaintiff
of a testimonial for the defendant's pills, was not covered by any right
of privacy, and the Court apparently recognized it as a distinct
element of the wrong.2 The right of privacy protects against the
publication or exposure of facts-of things which truly exist but
ought to be published, e. g., one's facial features, family history,
etc. And the right to be protected against false statements-here,
statements of opinions not held or utterances never made-is a distinct right, and belongs under the head of defamation.
Moreover, this was here and in similar cases the really serious
part of the wrong. The case was this: The defendant published
in an advertising pamphlet a testimonial recommending its kidney
pills; this testimonial was attributed to Col. Jack Chinn, the plaintiff,
and read: "I join in endorsing Doan's Kidney Pills. * * * A few
1.-"The publication of the picture, * * is a violation of the right of privacy,"
per Hobson, J., for the Court, p. 432.
2.-A man has the right to complain when he is published In a directory * * *
as Indorsing a patent medicine he has never seen," per Hobson, J., p. 432.
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boxes of pills effectually routed my ailment. * * * Yours truly, J.
P. Chinn ;" the plaintiff had not written the letter, nor authorized it,
and his friends had ridiculed him by reason of this false publication;
moreover, there was a notorious custom of selling such testimonials
to medicine-vendors, and this implied possible lack of integrity in
the plaintiff.
It is important to place this species of wrongful act where it
belongs in the law, because it is becoming more common in several
forms; and greater protection is needed against it in all its forms.
On its face, the present case falls within the well-known fourth
category of defamation, viz., words actionable per se, because tending to bring the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt. But
the narrow limitation of this term "hatred, ridicule, or contempt,"
does not suffice to include all the kinds of such defamation that need
protection, nor all the kinds that have in fact been protected by the
courts. Let us review the several classes of utterance, and see
whether they can be generalized. We are concerned with cases in
which the defendant falsely attributes to the plaintiff some utterance.
(i) First rriay be noted these cases, like Col. Chinn's, in which the
false attributon of an utterance does tend to produce hatred, ridicule
or contempt. Another instance is that of Peck vs. Chicago Tribune
Co., 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. 554 (I909), in which the defendant falsely
attributed to the plaintiff, a nurse, a testimonial recommending
whisky as used by her; this tended to lead "an appreciable fraction
of persons to regard the plaintiff with contempt." So also Martin v.
Picayune Co., 115 La. 979, 40 So. 376 (19o6), where the defendant
published a glowing account of a marvelous cure performed by the
plaintiff physician, and falsely represented the story as communicated by him; the publication was ostensibly laudatory, but it placed
the plaintiff in the class of advertising physicians, and thus brought
him into contempt with professional and public opinion. And in
England we have Clark v. Freeman, ii Beav. 112 (1848), where the
defendant advertised pills of his own, purporting to be "a certain cure
for consumption," as "Sir James Clark's Consumption Pills," thus
falsely attributing to the plaintiff the composition of the pills and the
assent to the quack vending of them. Here the Court treated the
publication as wrongful on two grounds; first, that the defendant
imputed to the plaintiff a share in the quack vending, which would be
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"a serious injury to him in the way of slander," and, secondly, that
the public might be induced through the plaintiff's name to use pills
which might be harmful.
The latter aspect of Clark v. Freeman, viz., the false attribution
to the plaintiff, not of any statement, but of the invention or composition of the medicine, belongs under a distinct class of cases, like
that of Edison, cited later.
(2). Next, there are the cases in which the defendant falsely
attributes to the plaintiff an association or connection with a third
person's business. In Routh v. Webster, 1o Beav. 561 (1847), the
defendant had issued a prospectus of his projected transportation
company, and named the plaintiff, without authority, as one of the
trustees of the company; the redress was placed on the ground that
the publication might "involve him in all sorts of liabilities" and in
litigation to defend bimself from them. So also in Dixon v. Holden,
L. R. 7, Eq. 488 (1869) the defendant was enjoned from publishing
a creditor's notice of bankruptcy of a firm in which the name of the
plaintiff was given as a "solvent partner ;" the effect would have been
"seriously damaging to. the plaintiff's business of a merchant." And
again, in Walter v. Ashton, (i9o2), 2 Ch. 282, where the defendant
was advertising his bicycles as "The Times Bicycles," imputing the.
same sort of connection as The London Times (owned by the plaintiff), had with the sale of the Encyclopedia Britannica, the Court
forbad the advertisement on the grounds that it might "expose him to
risk or liability" and thus of injury to property.
(3). Thirdly, there is the case where the defendant falsely attributes to the plaintiff the authorship of an essay, book, poem, or
other expression of views which carries no probability of causing
hatred, ridicule or contempt. The only case apparently is that of
Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Merivale 29 (1816), where the defendant
was restrained from falsely advertising certain poems for sale as
the composition of the plaintiff. The grounds of the judgment are
not reported; the sale might of course interfere with the sale of
genuine poems; and the false poems might detract from the plaintiff's professional repute. But the latter circumstance does not appear
in the case; and the former aspect was not essential, and moreover
would not be covered by any copyright, for the plaintiff had no
author's copyright in these poems. The principle of this class of
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cases is quite independent of copyright, or of the marketable quality
of the utterance ascribed to the plaintiff. It includes all cases where
the defendant falsely attributes to the plaintiff's composition any
statement, whether it be in book, pamphlet, or interview; whether it
be of personal opinion or of fact; and whether the tenor of the statement be hateful or contemptible in the minds of readers. This is the
class of cases in which belongs the false attribution of testimonials
which are not in themselves (as Col. Chinn's was) disreputable.
(4). Fourthly, there is a class of cases,, analogous to the preceding, in which the defendant falsely attributes to the plaintiff, not
the authorship of a written utterance, but the authorship of an article
or substance, invented or discovered or manufactured by his act. In
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392,
(i9o7) the defendant published an advertisement of a painkiller under
the name "Edison Polyform," bearing Thomas Edison's picture. Now
Thomas Edison had in fact discovered a painkiller formula, which
he had named "Polyform," and had sold to L., from whom by due
assignments it had come to the defendant. But the defendant made
the substance himself, and in making it omitted one element of Edison's original formula. There was therefore no flaw in the defendant's right to use the original formula, nor the name of Edison as its
inventor. But Edison objected to the false imputation that he was
the inventor of the incorrect formula actually used by the defendant,
and that he, Edison, was concerned in making the substance as sold
by the plaintiff. There was here a possible relation to the first class
of cases above, if it hadplainly appeared that the incorrect formula
was a failure as a painkiller, and was therefore likely to injure the
plaintiff's repute by causing ridicule or contempt. But this possibility
was not essential. What Edison was entitled to be protected against
was the false attribution to him of a formula and substance for which
he had no actual responsibility as an inventor, regardless of whether
he could prove that it was dangerous or futile as a painkiller. And
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's name was, enjoined.
A related class of cases is found where the defendant impudently
adopts the name of a famous person or institution to advertise his
wares-as for example by dubbing his shoeblacking "Henry Watterson Shine," or by naming his fertilizer the "Harvard Fertilizer."
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These acts cannot be reached by the law of trademark or of unfair
trade, because the plaintiff is not in any trade that is competed for.
Nor does the right of privacy protect. The wrong belongs in the
present place. A plain case of it was that of Vassar College v. LooseWiles Biscuit Co., D. C. Mo., i97 Fed. 982, (1912), where the de-

fendant without authority placed the plaintiff's name upon chocolate
candy and sought thereby to imply that its candy was favored at
Vassar College. It is disappointing to find the learned Federal
Court impotent to reach such a wrong. Trade is full of such unjust
and contemptible expedients, and it is a disgrace to our law that a
Court should declare itself unable to give protection.
The case of Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. L. 910, 927, 67 Atl.
97, 103 (19o7), belongs either here or in the second class. The plain-

tiff's wife in this case had borne a child two years after marriage, but
by an adulterous father; the wife had falsely stated to the attending
physician that the"plaintiff was the father; the physician had so stated
in the birth certificate, which was duly recorded in the State Bureau
of Vital Statistics. This record might become evidence of paternity,
and thus entitle the child to a share in the plaintiff's estate and a
reception in the community as his child. And the plaintiff was held
entitled to have the record expunged and the wife and child restrained from claiming the plaintiff's paternity. Here there is an
aspect of a contingent property liability, as in the second class above,
but essentially it is a case of the fourth class.
(5). Finally there is the common situation (but not yet, apparently, represented by any decisions) in which the defendant falsely
attributes to the plaintiff the possession of some opinion. This is unlike the third class, -in that it does not attribute any statement or
utterance of the opinion. And it is unlike the fourth class, in that it
does not attribute any act of invention or authorship. But it is a not
uncommon form of injury in current journalistic practice. The irresponsible vendors of sensations, moved by the meanest motives of
mankind, will recklessly attribute to this or that personage some view
on current affairs which is alien to his actual thoughts and is calculated to make hard feelingg that never can be assuaged by protestation. If a journalist attributes to Senator Smith the sentiment, that
"Colonel Roosevelt is a firebrand," or to Mr. Howells the belief that
"H. G. Wells is a scatterbrained dreamer," it is a false statement which

8
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ought to be actionable per se. And the intrinsic offensiveness of the
uterance is not the main element is the wrong, but the incorrectness of
the attribution of any opinion. At this point the essence of wrong
in the third class of cases and in this fifth class of cases is the same.
The writer once made an address before the Young Men's Christian
Association on "The Legal Profession," and a newspaper report made
without consent, attributed falsely to the speaker the assertion that
"a ;man need not be honest to be a' successful lawyer." Now the test
of wrongfulness here should not be whether this opinion or utterance
falsely attributed, tends to bring the person into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt, but whether the opinion ascribed is one which it is disagreeable to the speaker to be supposed to entertain. I am entitled to be
judged in public by 'y actual opinions and utterances. To have
false ones ascribed to me is an injury to my feelings of self respect.
And that is the injury against which T am entitled to be protected.
The right of privacy is really a right to be protected against a certain
kind of injury to feelings. And that is the feature common to that
right and the present one. The right to be protected against defamation, i. e., against loss of repute and patronage among other persons,
does not -here reach the essence of the wrong. Suppose that some
journalist falsely publishes my name on the committee list of the
Progressive party or the Democratic party; or attributes to me the
views of the futurist painters or the classical painters. Now the
essential thing is not whether in this community the Progressive
party or the Democratic party is viewed with contempt; nor whether
the public laughs more at the futurists or at the classicists. The
essential thing is that I do not entertain the convictions falsely
ascribed me-that it injures my just feelings of self respect to be
classed where I do not care to be classed-and that I am entitled to
be protected against such an unauthorized misrepresentation of my
personality.
There seems to be germ enough of principle in the precedents
to invite the Courts to give this protection whenever they have the
claim squarely presented to them. But the question is, how to phrase
the principle?
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Let jis try to cover all the foregoing classes of cases, dealing in
some form with the false attribution of a belief, act, or utterance:
I. Where the false attribution of a belief, act, or utterance,
tends to produce hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or imputes professional
impropriety, it is actionable. This is a simple application of the
established principles of defamation. It represents class (I) of the
above cases.
II. Where the fact falsely attributed is one which if true would
by reasonable possibility involve liability of the plaintiff, or his estate,
to a third person on a claim of contract or tort, or diminution of the
property right of the plaintiff or his estate, it is actionable. This
covers the second class of cases. It is not reached by the orthodox
definitions of defamation as hitherto recognized, though the decisions
justify it.
IIL Where the false attribution consists in the authorship of
an alleged utterance (whether or not the utterance is of the former
two sorts), it is actionable; provided that if the utterance is one which
would not have been copyrightable, a substantially correct report may
be justified. (This is necessary, because *in the case of poems or the
like, any garbling of the text would be an injury). This covers class
(3) above.
IV. Where the false attribution consists in the association of
the plaintiff's name with any substance or article alleged to have been
invented, discovered, made, or approved by the plaintiff, it is actionable. This covers class (4) above. The Courts have here not gone
far enough yet.
V. Where the false attribution consists in an opinion or belief,
it is actionable, provided the opinion is one which the plaintiff does
and reasonably may resent as disagreeable to him. Here the Courts
have still a forward step to take. But amidst modern conditions of
insolent false publicity there is no reason why the law should not
extend its protection.
JOHN H. WIGMORE,
Northwestern University Law School,
Chicago.

